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Abstract
New Zealand, as in other jurisdictions, has a range of
recognized trusts that would be familiar to many.
These include express trusts, resulting trusts, con-
structive trusts, and charitable trusts. Perhaps more
unfamiliar, at least to those outside New Zealand, are
trusts that are unique to the New Zealand legal land-
scape and that are specific to Maori land. This article
explores the relevance, and importance, of such
trusts within New Zealand—Aotearoa. In doing so,
the author considers a number of these Maori land
trusts, and critically evaluates a range of issues, which
includes governance; conflict of interest; unsatisfac-
tory conduct; and dysfunction. While Maori land
trusts are subject to the general laws of trust, it can
be seen from the article how valuable such trusts are
in recognizing and protecting Maori interests. As
such, their unique nature reflects their fundamental
relevance in indigenous culture, and also generally as
an effective management tool for much Maori land.
Introduction
There are several types of equitable interest in prop-
erty, trusts being just one of them, and it is likely that
trusts are the best known of the types of equitable
interest. Other equitable interests include equitable
leases, and equitable mortgages. With respect to
trusts, the beneficiary, who is the equitable interest
holder, has the right to compel the legal owner, the
trustee to recognize, and give effect to the
beneficiary’s interest. The nature of the interest held
by the beneficiary will depend on the terms of the
trust.1 There is also a range of trusts that are recog-
nized in New Zealand, like other jurisdictions, which
include express trusts, resulting trusts, constructive
trusts, and charitable trusts.
In addition to these recognized trusts, New Zealand
has a unique range of trusts specific to Maori land.
The Maori Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
constitute the five types of Maori trusts, and these are
authorized by the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993
(Maori Land Act 1993), and are as follows:
Ahu Whenua—this is the main form of trust where
the total freehold interest in Maori land or General
land owned by Maori is vested in a trust/trustee by
the Maori Land Court, and is utilized to promote
and facilitate the use and administration of the land
for those who are beneficial owners of the land. This
type of trust is the equivalent of section 438 trust
under the now repealed Maori Affairs Act 1953.2
Whanau—these are share-managed type trusts.
Such trusts were introduced under the Act and
under them, land interests of the living or the
deceased owner are vested in trustees, generally
family members, and no further succession or frag-
mentation occurs.3
Whenua Topu—such trusts are similar to the ahu
whenua trusts, in that they are land-management
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1. Andrew S Butler, ‘Equitable Proprietery Interests’ in Andrew Butler (ed), Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (ThomsonReuters 2009) 23–24.
2. Richard Boast and others, Maori Land Law (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2004) 163.
3. ibid; ‘whanau’ means extended family group5http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/tribal-organisation/page-44 accessed 17 December2015
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trusts, but whenua topu trusts operate to facilitate
the use and administration of the land in the inter-
ests of iwi4 or hapu,5 as opposed to those with a
beneficial interest in the land.6
Kai Tiaki—where real or personal property owned by
a Maori person under disability is vested by the Maori
Land Court in a trustee(s).7 This is the only trust that
relates solely to individuals. Such trusts can work
under the umbrella of whanau, putea, ahu whenua
or whenua topu trusts, or Maori incorporations.8
Putea—these are share management type trusts, which
are designed to manage impractical, or undesirable,
limited value interests, or to manage interests where
those with beneficial interests are not known.9 Limited
numbers of these trusts have been created.
NewZealandhasauniquerange oftrusts spe-
cific to Maori land
It is worthwhile noting that Maori land can be held
on trust by other means. Maori are at liberty to utilize
other forms of trust to hold land, thus drawing on
other forms of trust law.10
To contextualize these types of unique trusts within
the New Zealand legal landscape, it is worthwhile set-
ting out, briefly, the historical and modern-day pos-
itions of the Crown within New Zealand—Aotearoa.
By Article 1 of the Treaty of Waitangi,11 a number
of Maori chiefs purported to cede to the Crown ab-
solutely all of their rights and powers of sovereignty.
By Article 2, the Crown confirmed and guaranteed to
the, inter alia, Maori chiefs and tribes the full and
undisturbed possession of their land and possessions,
as long as they wished it. The Treaty was written in
Maori and English. It is acknowledged that there has
been difficulty in reconciling the two language ver-
sions, meaning that there still to this day is uncer-
tainty as to what was intended to be ceded, and what
was intended to be reserved.12 This is expressed elo-
quently by Cooke P in New Zealand Maori Council v
Attorney-General:13
The principles of the Treaty are to be applied, not the
literal words. As is well known, the English and Maori
texts in the first schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi Act
1975 are not translations the one of the other and do
not necessarily convey precisely the same meaning.
There is continuing debate over the effect of the
Treaty, and it is acknowledged that ‘Treaty issues are
a study in themselves and the literature is volumin-
ous.’14 It is not the intention of this article to explore
these issues further. The reality however is that the
Treaty is of fundamental importance and relevance
in New Zealand society. When the Treaty of
Waitangi Act 1975 was enacted, it changed the prac-
tical effect of the Treaty, if not its status. The Act es-
tablished the Waitangi Tribunal, which makes
recommendations on claims relating to the application
of the Treaty, and to determine of relevant matters are
consistent with the principles of the Treaty.15 When
the Crown assumed sovereignty over New Zealand,
Maori customary title was extinguished, along with
4. Iwi: a Maori tribe descended from a common-named ancestor(s), usually comprised of a number of hapu; see5http://ww.tkm.govt.nz/glossory4accessed 17
December2015
5. Hapu—a sub tribe; most iwi are comprised of two or more hapu; see5http://ww.tkm.govt.nz/glossory4 accessed 17 December2015
6. Boast and others (n 2).
7. ibid.
8. ‘Maori Land Trusts’ (Ministry of Justice 2010) 11 5http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/maori-land-court/documents/publications/booklets/
Maori%20Land%20Trusts.pdf4 accessed 17 December2015
9. Jacinta Ruru, ‘Equity and Maori’ in Andrew Butler (ed), Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (ThomsonReuters 2009) 1253.
10. ibid 1251.
11. See5http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty/the-treaty-in-brief4accessed 17 December2015: ‘The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand’s founding docu-
ment. It takes its name from the place in the Bay of Islands where it was first signed, on 6 February 1840. This day is now a public holiday in New Zealand. The
Treaty is an agreement, in Maori and English, that was made between the British Crown and about 540 Maori rangatira (chiefs).’
12. GW Hinde and others, Principles of Real Property Law (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2014) 26.
13. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 662 (CA).
14. Hinde and others (n 12) 27.
15. ibid.
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acquisition of land from Maori land owners. This fell
into two distinct periods:16
The first commencement on the assumption
of . . . Sovereignty in 1840 and continued until the es-
tablishment of the Maori Land Court in 1865; and the
second has lasted from that time until the present day.
From 1840 until 1865, in other words, prior to the
Maori Land Court, Crown agents usually negotiated
directly with Maori for the purchase or acquisition of
land. In 1865, the Maori Land Court was established,
although it was originally named the Native Land
Court. Under the Maori Purposes Act 1947, it
became the Maori Land Court. Its original purpose
was to translate customary Maori land claims into
legal land titles recognizable under English Law. In
1993, the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act was enacted
as a culmination of work to assist with the use and
development of Maori land, to enable some flexibility
in land management, including trusts.17 In other
words, the Act was created to promote the retention,
use, development, and control of Maori customary
land and Maori freehold land.18 One of the benefits
of this Act was to expand the court’s jurisdiction to
allow it to hear cases on all matters pertaining to
Maori land.19
The Maori Land Court today, through Te Ture
Whenua Maori Act 1993, endeavours to promote
the retention, use, development, and control of
Maori land as taonga tuku iho by Maori owners,
their whanau, their hap u, and their descendants.20
Section 129(1) of the Te Ture Whenua Act, provides
that for the purposes of the Act, all land in New
Zealand has one of the following statuses:21
 Maori customary land;
 Maori freehold land;
 General land owned by Maori;
 Crown land; and
 Crown land reserved for Maori.
Section 131 of the Act gives the Maori Land Court
jurisdiction to determine and declare the particular
status of a parcel of land.
As mentioned earlier, the Act provides for five types
of Maori trusts that relate mainly to Maori land, and
the Maori Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
constitute these authorized Maori trusts, which are
ahu whenua; whanau; kai tiaki; putea; and whenua
topu, as described above.22 However, like other
trusts, they can also be constituted by will or deed,
and given effect to by a court order, on the proviso
that there is no conflict with the Act.23
It should be noted that the topic of Maori land
trusts is very expansive, and as a result, it will be
outside the scope of this article to consider all the
matters pertaining to such trusts, and indeed to con-
sider each type of trust in detail. Therefore, this article
focuses on some key discussion points to highlight the
significance and relevance of Maori land trusts in the
New Zealand legal landscape. We therefore turn now
to considering some of those five statutory forms of
Maori land trust, concentrating in particular on the
more common types of Maori land trusts, beginning
with ahu whenua trusts.
Ahuwhenua trusts
As mentioned above, this is the main form of trust
where the total freehold interest in Maori land or
General land owned by Maori is vested in a trust/
trustee by the Maori Land Court, and is utilized to
16. ibid 30 citing EJ Haughey, ‘Some Aspects of Maori Leases’ in Landlord and Tenant (1975) 341, 342.
17. See5http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/maori-land-court/about-us/past-present-future-of-the-maori-land-court4
18. ibid; Ruru (n 9) 1250.
19. ibid.
20. ibid; ‘taonga tuku iho’ translates as, inter alia, cultural property, or heritage5http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom¼&phrase¼&proverb¼&loan
¼&keywords¼taongaþtukuþiho&search¼4
21. Hinde and others (n 12) 31.
22. Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s 211.
23. Doug McPhail, ‘Trusts Relating to Maori Land’ in Richard Boast and others (eds), Maori Land Law (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2004) 163.
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promote and facilitate the use and administration of
the land for those who are beneficial owners of the
land. We will reference a number of cases to highlight
some key matters with regard to this type of trust,
beginning first with the general matter of governance.
Governance
Maori land trustees have the same obligations as other
trustees, which means that they have a duty, inter alia,
to act fairly and impartially between beneficiaries and
to invest trust funds prudently.24 Specific rules per-
taining only to Maori trusts are contained in the Te
Ture Whenua Maori Act, although the equitable pro-
visions set out in the Trustee Act 1956, and the body
of trust law, also all apply to Maori trusts, unless they
are excluded, or inconsistent with the provisions of
the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act.25 As an example of
specific provisions regarding Maori trusts, it has been
recognized, specifically in relation to ahu whenua
trusts, that payment of fees, honoraria, and other
forms of remuneration to trustees:
is permissible in general terms, depending on the rele-
vant circumstances in each individual case.26
Thus, a number of Maori trustee duties under ahu
whenua trusts were set out by Harvey J, in the case
of Re Tauhara Middle 15 Trust, as follows:27
Yet it should also be underscored that ahu whenua
trusts have a defined purpose under section 215 of
the Act [the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993] and
must operate according to the trust’s particular trust
order. While it can be desirable for trustees acting
apparently with the support of their owners, their
wha¨nau and hapu¨, to repurchase traditional lands
lost from communal control, they must do so consist-
ent with their duties as ahu whenua trustees. Their
principal duty is to obey their terms of trust. They
have equally crucial duties of protecting the assets of
the trust and acting prudently when investing trust
funds. When so investing they must avoid hazardous
or speculative ventures. This is because the custodian-
ship of the existing corpus lands remains paramount.
Maori land trustees have the same obligations
as other trustees, which means that they have
aduty, interalia, to act fairlyandimpartiallybe-
tween beneficiaries and to invest trust funds
prudently.24 Specific rules pertaining only to
Maori trusts are contained in the Te Ture
WhenuaMaoriAct, althoughtheequitablepro-
visions set out in theTrustee Act 1956, and the
body of trust law, also all apply to Maori trusts,
unless they are excluded, or inconsistent with
the provisions oftheTeTureWhenuaMaori Act
What this case emphasized is the need for gov-
ernors of Maori land trusts to have due regard for
governance issues when carrying out their obligations,
and in particular to have due regard to the
following:28
 To exercise their responsibilities prudently;
 To address real and potential conflicts of interest
when making decisions;
 To consider carefully the recommendations of pro-
fessional advisors; and
 To understand that owners’ resolutions are not
binding on trustees.
More recently, the case of Parengarenga 3D v Slade29
also highlighted issues surrounding the very real im-
portance of good governance, and illustrates the ser-
ious impact of poor governance. Parengarenga 3D
comprises approximately 500 hectares, and had been
committed to plantation forestry for about 30 years.
24. Ruru (n 9) 1254.
25. McPhail (n 23) 164.
26. Re Pukeroa Oruawhata Trust BC200392563 24 December 2003, 5.
27. Re Tauhara Middle 15 Trust 30/07/08 87 Taupo MB 107 30 July 2008 at [70]; see also Rameka v Hall [2013] NZCA 203 [5 June 2013] at [29].
28. Tama Potaka, ‘Maori Land and Governance’ [2009] NZLJ 106.
29. Parengarenga 3D v Slade 87 Taitokerau MB 46 12 September 2014.
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An ahu whenua trust had been in place since at least
1987. The Maori Trustee had been the responsible
trustee up until 2009, when the forest was harvested
and the trust received over $1 million New Zealand
dollars. The Maori Trustee was replaced with seven
trustees appointed by the Maori Land Court, four of
which were subsequently removed by the Court in
2014. Between 2012 and 2013, the four former trustees
received substantial payments from the Trust, equal-
ling 700,000 dollars. At the time of this hearing, the
Trust’s bank account then held less than $14.
This case concerned the alleged misappropriation
of funds and an application for a Mareva injunction
to secure Trust assets.30 While inevitably the case
focused on questions applicable to Mareva injunc-
tions, the discussions also illustrated very real issues
regarding governance of the Trust, and the lack of any
documentation to support payments to the former
trustees, and their lack of responses, supported a
good arguable case of equitable, if not, actual
fraud.31 This meant that there were significant ques-
tions to be answered by those trustees32 in relation to
their governance and their duties towards the Trust in
question. On the face of it, the four former trustees
appear, at the very least:
to have acted without any appreciation or understand-
ing of the fiduciary obligations they owed to the trust.33
The losses attributed to the poor governance were so
serious that they were reported in the national press.34
Therefore, ensuring good governance generally is
key in managing Maori land trusts such as ahu
whenua trusts, as with other types of trusts.
However, governance may also be considered in
more specific terms, including issues surrounding a
number of trustees’ duties, such as conflict of interest
and improper behaviour for a trustee, to which this
article now turns specifically in relation to such trusts.
Conflict of interest
Harvey J, in the case of Re Tauhara Middle 15 Trust,35
addressed the issue of conflict of interest in relation to
Tauhara Middle 15, which is Maori freehold land, with
over 3000 beneficial owners, and the land is adminis-
tered by an ahu whenua trust. There were a number of
issues under discussion in this case, but our focus rests
on the conflict of interest in this instance. The trustees
of Tauhara Middle 15 Trust, in a complex number of
transactions, purchased land via the Hikuwai Hapu
Lands Trust. The allegations were raised in terms of
the roles of the trustees, the competing interests of the
various trusts, particularly Hikuwai, and the trustees’
duties to the beneficiaries.36 The affected trustees sat
on all three trusts involved in the purchase, and all
three trusts were advised, or at least encouraged, by
the same solicitors over the decision whether or not to
enter the purchase.37 What was made clear by the
Judge was that in matters relating to conflict of inter-
est, it is not sufficient to declare that conflict at a
meeting, nor is it sufficient to attempt to have it
waived by the meeting of owners.38 The duty to
ensure that there is no conflict of interest is far more
strict than that. Indeed, a trustee’s decision can even be
‘tainted given the potential for and appearance of con-
flict’.39 It might however have been possible to have
dealt with that potential or appearance of conflict by
taking their solicitor’s advice and applying for direc-
tions, which was not done.
Therefore, Harvey J concluded that the three af-
fected trustees did place themselves in actual, or
30. ibid [15], [24], and [25].
31. ibid [27].
32. ibid [33].
33. Mark von Dadelszen, ‘Obligations of those Governing Not-For-Profits—A Crisis to be Addressed?’ [2015] NZLJ 113, 114.
34. ‘Maori Trust’s $1 million is now $15’ The New Zealand Herald: Auckland (15 October 2014)5http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_
id¼3&objectid¼113424734
35. Tauhara Middle 15 Trust (n 27).
36. ibid [82].
37. ibid [85].
38. ibid [89].
39. ibid.
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potential conflict of interest, or even the appearance
of conflict, given their roles on the trusts in ques-
tion.40 It is evident therefore that such Maori land
trusts require strict adherence to the duty to ensure
that there is no conflict of interest when trustees carry
out their duties, and further:
the appearance of bias or conflict is sufficient since
actual conflict need not be proved.41
The New Zealand Supreme Court, in the very
recent case of Fenwick v Naera,42 addressed just this
issue, inter alia, and specifically made reference to the
issue of avoiding the appearance, and risk of conflict.
The appeal concerned alleged conflicts of interest in
relation to a joint venture, which was entered in to by
the Whakapoungakau 24 Ahu Whenua Trust (com-
monly referred to as the Tikitere Trust), and two
other Maori trusts.43
Three of the trustees were alleged to have conflicts
of interest, on which the Supreme Court commented,
although it has remitted the issue to the Maori Land
Court for final decisions on the conflicts in light of
the judgment, because the Supreme Court was not
certain that it had all the relevant information. With
regard to trustee Pirihira Fenwick, the Court held that
she was interested or concerned in the joint venture
arrangements because she was a beneficiary of one of
the trusts, with an approximate 4.71 per cent share in
that trust. As a result, she:
had a real and appreciable possibility of conflict be-
tween interest and duty and should not have taken
part in the decision making process.44
With regard to trustee Tai Eru, the Court noted that
his interest in the trust would be de minimus, in other
words, there was likely ‘no sensible possibility of con-
flict’.45 However, what was noted in the footnotes by the
Supreme Court was that even a very small interest in a
very large transaction could still raise the possibility of a
conflict between interest and duty. However, in this
situation, the Court was not sufficiently apprised of all
the information pertaining to the joint venture to make
a definitive finding on this point. Nonetheless, what this
does speak to is the very serious obligations imposed
upon trustees of ahu whenua trusts to ensure that con-
flicts of interest do not arise.
With regard to the third trustee, the late Winnie
Emery, the Court held that while her husband was a
trustee of one of the trusts involved, this did not
render her as conflicted under section 227A of the
Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993.46
In application to Mrs Fenwick, and possibly Mr
Eru, the Court determined that under section
227A(2), the former (and possibly the latter),
should not have participated in the discussions sur-
rounding the transactions, or in the voting. The sec-
tion states the following:47
A trustee must not vote or participate in the discus-
sion on any matter before the trust that directly or
indirectly affects that person’s remuneration or the
terms of that person’s employment as a servant or
officer of the trust, or that directly or indirectly affects
any contract in which that person may be interested or
concerned other than as a trustee of another trust.
It had been argued that the breach of section 227A(2)
had no effect, given the ability for decisions to be
made by a majority, however, the Court was in agree-
ment with the Court of Appeal that all trustees, who
take part in decision making, must ‘bring to bear a
mind unclouded by any contrary interest’.48 Nor was
40. ibid.
41. ibid [90].
42. Fenwick v Naera [2015] NZSC 68.
43. ibid [1].
44. ibid [57].
45. ibid [58], citing Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL) 124.
46. ibid [59].
47. See (n 22) s 227A(2).
48. Fenwick v Naera (n 42) [61], citing Naera v Fenwick [2013] NZCA 353 [99].
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it any defence that their fellow trustees supported the
decision. It is clear that section 227A provides that
conflicted trustees should not participate in discus-
sions on matters that affect their interests. There is
an eminently sensible reason for such stringent re-
quirements, and that is because:49
. . . a conflicted trustee must not participate in discus-
sions is to remove the risk that the other decision
makers may be influenced (either consciously or sub-
consciously) by a person with divided loyalties.
It is also important to note that lack of personal fi-
nancial consideration will not negate the duty to
avoid a conflict of interest. Neither Mrs Fenwick,
nor Mr Eru was driven by such a consideration, but
it was noted that this may only have been at a con-
scious level. In addition, beneficiaries are entitled to
know that every trustee who considered, and voted in
favour of the transaction, did so ‘without conflict of
interest and the risk of being influenced by that con-
flict’,50 and importantly, whether or not that person
was in fact influenced.51 Therefore, it matters not if
the influence actually occurred, the mere fact that it
could is the issue at hand. Further to this point, the
Court concurred with the Court of Appeal that rules
against conflicts, and section 227A, are ‘designed with
prophylactic effect’.52 In other words, ‘to avoid the
appearance, and risk, of conflict’.53 Such an effect
applies:54
. . . both in terms of a conflicted trustee being influ-
enced by the conflict (consciously or subconsciously)
and of influencing fellow decision makers (again, con-
sciously or subconsciously).
In relation to the notion of influence, whether con-
scious or subconscious, the Court pertinently noted
that a court is not best placed to ‘decide the existence
and the extent of any influence’.55 The reality is that
evidence pertaining to influence, or otherwise, is lim-
ited, and trustees will be required to ‘reconstruct the
decision-making process with the benefit of hind-
sight’, which could falsify the process, and indeed, if
the influence has been subconscious, then the trustees
will not even be aware of it to express its impact.56
This, therefore, drives to the heart of the matter.
Conflicts of interest can be insidious, and their effects
may be wide ranging and highly damaging. As a
result, the stringent burdens upon trustees to avoid
conflicts of interest are well placed and much desirous
to protect the interests of the beneficiaries. So, while it
is evident that all trustees are duty bound to avoid
such conflicts,57 contemporary evidence points to
such duties being equally measured for trustees of
ahu whenua trusts.
Avoiding a conflict of interest is clearly an import-
ant obligation for all ahu whenua trust trustees, but
equity imposes numerous other duties on such trus-
tees, including the requirement to ensure that their
conduct is befitting a trustee. Unsatisfactory conduct
can take a variety of forms, and we will consider some
circumstances within ahu whenua trusts where trustee
conduct has fallen under the spotlight.
Unsatisfactoryconduct
In Scott v Sullivan,58 the Maori Land Court heard a
number of allegations made against two trustees of an
ahu whenua trust, Virginia Sullivan and Mischele
Cowan-Sullivan, including resiling from a unanimous
49. ibid [61].
50. ibid [62].
51. ibid.
52. ibid [63].
53. ibid [62], referring to Naera v Fenwick [2013] NZCA 353 [99], and [101]–[102].
54. Fenwick v Naera (n 42) [63].
55. ibid [64].
56. ibid.
57. ibid [69]–[70], referring to Andrew S Butler, ‘Fiduciary Law’ in Andrew S Butler (ed), Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd edn, ThomsonReuters 2009)
476 and J Mowbray and others, Lewin on Trusts (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) [20–01].
58. Scott v Sullivan 27 Takitimu MB 5 A20130008184 3 October 2013.
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trustee decision, and cultivating illegal drugs on trust
property. In relation to the latter allegation, Harvey J
dealt with this promptly. Quite simply, the conviction
of an imprisonable offence for carrying out activities
on trust land, of which she was a trustee, with the
responsibility of acting in the best interests of the
beneficiaries could hardly be construed as acting pru-
dently or appropriately for a trustee. As such, her
position was quite untenable.59 While this seems en-
tirely proper to take such a firm stance, the Judge was
in no way prepared to be lenient even with the trustee
expressing regret as to her actions overall. This illus-
trates the very seriousness of the duties of trustees,
including ahu whenua trustees, and the commitment
by courts to observe such onerous duties.
With regard to the allegation of resiling from a
unanimous decision to support a particular proposal,
Harvey J noted that her actions resulted in the Trust
becoming embroiled in litigation and incurring un-
necessary legal costs. This was, in the Judge’s view, con-
duct that was ‘both imprudent and inappropriate’.60 If
a trustee appears to be at an impasse with the other
trustees, the duty is upon the trustees to seek direction
from the court, which, in this case, was not undertaken.
It mattered not to the court that the trustee acted with
honest belief that her actions were correct, her actions
were still judged as being unreasonable, because she
acted contrary to legal advice and in defiance of earlier
agreements.61 Therefore, it is evident that actions can
still be unreasonable, even if a trustee genuinely believes
them to be correct.
The Maori Land Court, in the ahu whenua trust
case of Tunapahore 6 Block v Powell62 confirmed
that trustees have obligations to beneficiaries to ad-
minister the trust in accordance with general trust
law, the Trustee Act 1956, the Te Ture Whenua
Maori Act 1993, and the Maori Reservation
Regulations 1994. In other words:
trustees are subject to traditional trustee duties with
the overlay of particular obligations arising from the
context of Maori reservations.63
Grazing stock, growing crops, and removing timber
for personal benefit, with no gain or benefit for the
shareholders, by a trustee breached such obligations.
Failing to take steps to rectify issues with trust prop-
erty may also result in a finding that trustees’ actions
resulted in unsatisfactory conduct. This issue was raised
in the Court of Appeal in the case of Rameka v Hall.64
The question for the Court, inter alia, was whether or
not the trustees in question carried out their duties
satisfactorily in relation to a number of transactions
involving significant amounts of money. In relation to
the meaning of satisfactory conduct, the Court referred
to Bramley v Hiruharama Ponui Inc—Committee of
Management—Hiruharama Ponui Inc, where the
Court made reference to the following passage:65
Whether governance performance has been satisfac-
tory or not must depend then on whether there is a
clear and present apprehension of risk to the incorp-
oration asset or to the wider interests of the incorp-
oration shareholders as a result of action or inaction
of the committee. It is not every unsatisfactory act or
omission which should lead to removal, but those that
go to the principles of the Act. To adopt any other
approach, would lead to removal being the primary
remedy available for any technical breach of the Act.
We do not think that wholesale removal of Maori
governance members is consistent with the principles
of the Act or the intentions of the legislature.
While it was acknowledged that the case of Bramley
involved a corporation, the provisions referred to
above are applicable, and therefore the Court, in as-
sessing the conduct of the trustees, would need to
59. ibid [27].
60. ibid [30].
61. ibid [31].
62. Tunapahore 6 Block v Powell (2015) 118 Waioriki MB 150.
63. ibid [15].
64. Rameka v Hall (n 27).
65. ibid [32], citing Bramley v Hiruharama Ponui Inc—Committee of Management—Hiruharama Ponui Inc (2006) 11 Waiariki Appellate MB 144 (11AP 144)
[159]
218 Articles Trusts & Trustees, Vol. 22, No. 2, March 2016
 by guest on February 24, 2016
http://tandt.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
consider the impact of their actions on the benefici-
aries and any ‘apprehension of risk to the assets’.66
In relation to the mussel farm venture, the Court con-
curred with the lower courts that as the investment went
sour, the trustees failed to act prudently. Rather the:
matter was simply allowed to drag on for too long,
given the considerable sums of money involved.67
In order to have acted satisfactorily, the trustees
could have taken a number of steps to discharge
their duties, including expressing and recording
their opposition to the ongoing investment of funds
in to the venture. When looked at as a whole, the
trustees should have done more to protect the trust
assets, and the key factors in arriving at this conclu-
sion were the magnitude of the sums involved and the
extended period of inaction.68
In relation to one of the transactions, that of the
Tauhara land purchase, a defence was raised that
there was cultural significance in regaining the land,
which reflects the added obligations on Maori land
trustees over other types of trustees. However, the
Court stated clearly that:
the motivation to regain land of cultural significance does
not displace the duties on the trustees to act prudently.69
This was made most clear by Harvey J in the lower
Court, albeit in relation to another area of land, where
he noted:70
Much was made of the return of haukainga land for
cultural and historic reasons. That desire is both
understandable and laudable. Where owners have
lost land through various means over time there is
often a strong wish to recover such lands, especially
those areas with iconic significance and where the op-
portunity presents itself for such restoration. But
those objectives cannot override the trustees’ principal
duties of protecting the existing assets of the trust and
their duty to act prudently.
Therefore, while culturally significant endeavours
are laudable and understandable, Maori land trustees
are still obliged to ensure that they are meeting their
trustee obligations, as reflected in relation to this ahu
whenua trust. Overall, therefore the Court of Appeal
concluded that the trustees committed a series of
breaches of their duties, causing substantial losses to
the trust, thus their conduct was unsatisfactory.71
It is evident therefore that ahu whenua trustees have
onerous obligations to meet under the requirements of
various statutory and common law provisions, and
this is equally the case with trustees of whanau trusts.
Whanau
It will be recalled from earlier in the article that these
are share-managed type trusts, which were introduced
under the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. Under
them, land interests of the living or the deceased
owner are vested in trustees, generally family mem-
bers, and no further succession or fragmentation
occurs.72 In other words, these trusts are family-
orientated trusts that allow whanau to bring together
their interests for the benefit of that whanau and their
descendants. Often these trusts will operate under the
umbrella of ahu whenua trusts or Maori incorpor-
ation. As long as the trust exists, there will be no
succession, thus the land interests remain vested in
the trustees. However, should a beneficiary die, the
Maori Land Court may determine a successor, as this
may assist the trustees to maintain the whakapapa.73
66. Rameka v Hall (n 27) [33].
67. ibid [50].
68. ibid.
69. ibid [78].
70. ibid [78], citing Rameka v Hall—Opepe Farm Trust (2011) Maori Appellate Court MB 535 (2011 Appeal 535) [105].
71. ibid [81].
72. Boast and others (n 2).
73. See (n 8) 12; ‘Whakapapa’ means geneaology.
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As is apparent therefore, such trusts are strongly
focused on whanau, and the Act sets out their pur-
pose as follows:74
The land, money, and other assets of a whanau trust
shall be held, and the income derived from those
assets shall be applied, for the purposes of promoting
the health, social, cultural and economic welfare, edu-
cation and vocational training, and general advance-
ment in life of the descendants of any tipuna (whether
living or dead) named in the order.
Since their introduction in July 1993, these trusts
have become a popular vehicle to prevent fragmenta-
tion of interests in Maori land.75 The benefits for
Maori in creating whanau trusts are therefore clear,
however, what some cases reveal is a tension between
whanau and trustees, and indeed divisions of whanau
themselves. We will explore some cases to assess the
courts’ ability to acknowledge Maori beliefs and prac-
tices in alignment with recognizing the applicability
of the relevant law with regard to whanau trusts.
Benefits of whanau trusts
The relevance of whanau trusts in the administration
of Maori land was illustrated in Re Hauai.76 In this
case, the applicant wished to gift all of his interests in
Hauai 2D5, 8, and 9 to his two daughters. This gift
would effectively exclude his son Duane, his deceased
son Viva, and all of their descendants from any inter-
ests in the Hauai lands. The proposed gifting was
under section 164 of the Te Ture Whenua Maori
Act 1993, which states:77
The court may, in accordance with this section, make
a vesting order for the transfer of any Maori freehold
land or any undivided interest in any such land to and
in favour of any person or persons to whom that land
or interest may be alienated in accordance with the
provisions of Part 7.
Ambler J made explicit reference to the discretion
available to the Court with regard to applications
under this section, which reflects the very real consid-
erations of all parties when dealing with Maori land
and interests:78
. . . Interests in Maori land are not synonymous with
interests in general land. They carry with them the con-
tingent ‘interests’ of the whanau, hapu and descendants
of the owners. (I use the word ‘interests’ cautiously as I
am not suggesting that they amount to either legal or
equitable interests in the land. The interests may only be
in the processes under the Act.) Owners wishing to
transfer interests may need to first traverse the objections
of their whanau, hapu and descendants.
In assessing the merits of a transfer the Court must
measure the circumstances of the case against the in-
tentions and objectives of the Act as set out in the
Preamble, section 2 and section 17. The proposed
transfer may give rise to tension between the object-
ives of retention of the land and use, management and
development of the land . . .
. . . Where a transfer is contentions or opposed the
Court should examine the underlying rationale for
the transfer. What is the practical purpose? How
does the transfer promote the ‘use, management and
development’ of the land? Does the transfer carry with
it obligations on the transferee? If so, how are they to
be given effect to? Is there an alternative to outright
alienation, such as creating a life interest only or vest-
ing in a whanau trust? Ultimately, where the transfer
contravenes the intentions and objectives the Act, the
Court may decline to order the transfer . . .
. . . This goes to the heart of the twin objectives of
retention and utilisation of Maori land that are some-
times in conflict . . .
74. See (n 22) s 214(3).
75. Boast and others (n 2) 183.
76. Re Smith - BC201560816 99 Taitokerau MB 200 31 March 2015.
77. See (n 22) s 164(1).
78. Smith (n 76) [5], citing Barnes – Te Horo 2B2B2B Residue (2008) 125 Whangeri MB 11 (125 WH 11) [27]–[31].
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Therefore, the Court’s assessment of the issues at
stake was fundamental in coming to a decision as to
whether transfers of land should occur because of the
relationships, obligations, legal requirements, and
interests involved. The applicant in this case saw his
daughters as having the right skills to administer the
land in the future, and His Honour had no doubt that
he was correct in this assessment, however, His
Honour asserted that:79
. . . absolute gifting as proposed is . . . a very blunt legal
tool which will exclude half of his children and their
descendants from Hauai lands.
The applicant’s remaining son had given his per-
mission for such a gift to take place, as he was of the
view that his sisters would not alienate the land from
the family, however, Ambler J reflected that an abso-
lute gift was not the most appropriate course of action
when taking in to consideration whanau matters. In
his view, the best legal approach would be to create a
whanau trust, which assist the applicant in achieving
his aims for his whanau. The whanau trust could in-
clude express provisions to accommodate the appli-
cant’s kaupapa80 for the land. Indeed, such a trust
would enable the daughters to have all the powers
necessary to administer the land, but without exclud-
ing any of the applicant’s descendants.
One daughter expressed dissatisfaction with such a
trust because she asserted that it would lead to on-
going disputes with the deceased son’s widow and his
children. Ambler J, however, asserted that the Te Ture
Whenua Maori Act 1993 expects Maori to look
beyond such things and instead she should focus on
the late brother’s children and their descendants, thus
reflecting the importance of the significance of the Act
in Maori land matters. As a result, the Judge con-
cluded that the proposed gifting would contravene
the kaupapa of the Act, thus section 164 could not
properly be invoked. He also noted that he could not
insist on the applicant agreeing to a whanau trust, but
equally, he was of the view that the application must
be dismissed because it was not in the best interests of
the whanau.81
Thus, while some members of the whanau believed
that an absolute gift to be the most appropriate
method of administering land, the Court could not
reconcile the opposing purpose of the Act and the
purpose of the applicant. Therefore, this case illus-
trates the very clear tensions that may arise in such
circumstances and how a court is able to align cul-
tural, holistic, and legal requirements in an objective
and appropriate manner with regard to the applica-
tion of whanau trusts.
Tensions between whanau were a key consideration
in two very recent cases before the Maori Land Court,
where the Court had to consider the level of dysfunc-
tion within a whanau trust, and then whether partial
termination of the trust would be an appropriate
course of action to take.
Whanau trusts anddysfunction
In the first case, that of Green v Trustees of Te Kou
Tiaki and Tangi Ataahya Green Whanau Trust,82 the
Court had to determine if there was sufficient
grounds to terminate the trust partially. In 2004, an
order was made to vest land interests of 12 persons in
a Whanau trust. As the Court noted, the objective of
the Whanau trust is to:83
. . . provide for the management of the Trust property
to the best advantage of the beneficiaries, to make pro-
vision for any special needs of the beneficiaries, to rep-
resent them on all matters relating to the shares and to
the use and enjoyment associated with those.
79. ibid [8].
80. ‘Kaupapa’—purpose or plan5http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz/word/24394
81. Smith (n 76) [8]–[11].
82. Green v Trustees of Te Kou Tiaki and Tangi Ataahya Green Whanau Trust 92 Waiariki MB 183 17 March 2014.
83. ibid [21].
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Thus the objective is to ensure the best interests of
the beneficiaries. The Court further noted that the
purpose of this trust was to bring together all the
interests of the Te Kou Tiaki and Rangi Ataahua
whanau. With the death of one of the trustees, the
trust has not been in a position to best manage the
interests of the beneficiaries because the trustees had
been inactive. Further, there was discord between the
applicant and the trustees. The applicant believed that
because he was their elder, he did not have to listen to
them, and the Court was concerned that he would
attempt to do what he wished and ignore the trustees.
He was determined to have his shares released from
this trust, but the Court had to weigh that desire
against the reason as to why he wants to terminate
the trust. It was noted, inter alia, that the applicant
was of the view that the trustees had not utilized the
Trust property to the best interest of the applicant;
that the trustees had been working against the appli-
cant; there was a lack of involvement by the trustees
in the Trust; and that due to the dysfunction of the
Trust, he cannot work with the trustees.84
The Court noted that any termination would have an
impact on the remaining beneficiaries adversely because
there would be a loss of voting power, and some po-
tential development, now that the trustees were active
once again. There was also overwhelming beneficiary
and trustee opposition to the partial termination.
Also of note to the Court in their determination
was the consideration a Court might have when as-
sessing the merit of a partial termination:85
a. the Preamble, s 2, and other matters listed in s
17 [Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993], includ-
ing the extent to which partial termination
achieves better retention, use, development
and control of the land in accordance with
the fundamental principles and purposes of
the legislation;
b. the purposes of the whanau trust;
c. the extent of beneficiary and trustee consent;
d. the impact of any termination on the remain-
ing beneficiaries and the trust; and
e. any evidence of dysfunction by the whanau
trustees to justify the Maori Land Court’s
intervention.
While the Court acknowledged the dysfunctional
relationship that existed between the applicant and
the trustee, when weighed against the other factors,
and taking in to account the Preamble, sections 2 and
17, the order for a partial termination was not
granted. It was evident that divisions were entrenched
in the whanau, but it would not be in the interests of
the applicant or the other beneficiaries to allow the
application. The applicant could not achieve the ob-
jectives he set for his shares, and he provided no suf-
ficient reason to warrant such a course of action.
Neither was there any credible evidence as to future
development options.
What this decision therefore indicates is that while
whanau may be divided, or there may be some dys-
function within the whanau or trust, the Te Ture
Whenua Maori Act, the Courts, and whanau trusts,
operate to ensure the benefit for the totality of the
whanau, so the greater good of the whanau is given
weight in preference to individual desires, which is a
reflection of the strength of whanua relationships.
The 2015 Maori Land Court case of Moa Larkins v
Hurae and Ngawiata Whanau Trust86 eloquently ex-
pressed the notions of whanau, and in particular, this
case focused on the concept of whanau trusts and
unity, even in the face of dysfunction.
The whanau trust was constituted for the benefit of
the descendants of Jack and Ngawaiata Larkins. At the
time of the application, there were three generations
of descendants who were beneficiaries of the whanau
trust, who would be impacted by its partial termin-
ation. Moa Larkins, the eldest of the seven children of
Jack Larkins, sought a partial termination of this
trust. The trust was established in 2005 to bring to-
gether the various Maori land interests to which Jack,
84. ibid [10] and [13]–[14].
85. ibid [16] citing Moa Harris Larkins or Moananui Larkins v Trevor Wi Kaitaia & Ors [2013] MAC MB [159].
86. Moa Larkins v Hurae and Ngawiata Whanau Trust 94 Taitokerau MB 120 15 January 2015.
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and his siblings, were entitled. Moa Larkins gave evi-
dence that he had not seen ‘eye to eye’ with his sib-
lings for many years, and while the trust was supposed
to unify the whanau, in reality, it had not resolved
their underlying differences. He expressed concern
that the Trust was not performing satisfactorily,
thus he sought to remove the interests in Waihou
Hutoia D2A from the Trust.87
Interestingly, the applicant acknowledged that
removing Waihou Hutoia D2A interests would in
fact not address the alleged dysfunction within the
Trust, as other interests contributed by Moa would
remain in the Trust. He also could not provide infor-
mation as to what he wished the whanau trust to do
with Waihou Hutoia D2A interests, and merely
argued that he wished those interests to be returned.
The real issue was the relationships between the sib-
lings, not the Trust itself.88
The Court determined that a partial termination of
the Trust would not in fact achieve a better retention,
use, development, and control of the Waihou Hutoia
D2A land. Whether the land interests were held by the
whanau trust, or by Moa, would not make any differ-
ence to the ability of the member of the whanau to
build on that land. Further, there was no evidence
before the Court to persuade it that the functioning
of this whanua trust was an impediment to any
member of the whanau building on that land.89
The next consideration was the purpose of the
whanau trust. This was set out in the objects clause,
and reads:90
To administer and preserve the interests of the whanau
and to use the income derived from those interests to
be applied for the purposes of promoting health, social,
cultural and economic welfare, education, and
vocational training and general advancement in the
life of the beneficiaries of the whanau trust.
It was noted that this purpose is virtually the
same for all whanau trusts constituted under the
Act, and the Court could find nothing in the pur-
poses that would suggest any form of exception
should be made for the interests that Moa contrib-
uted. What needed to be emphasized was the pur-
pose of this whanau trust. That was to bring some
unity to the whanau who had received different
interests from their parents over the years.91 In real-
ity, the partial termination of the trust by removing
the Waihou Hutoia D2A interests would ‘contra-
vene the very purpose of and rationale for the
trust’.92 The removal of those interests would, in
the Court’s view, be a clear and substantial detri-
ment to the other beneficiaries.93
Turning finally to the underlying issue of the dys-
function within the whanau trust, the Court noted
that there was very limited evidence of actual dysfunc-
tion.94 In reality, this was not a case ‘where a whanau
trust has been so dysfunctional that it is beyond re-
demption’.95 Rather, Moa had had a change of heart
and wished to retrieve the interests in that specific
block of land to which he had contributed the
whanau trust. In such circumstances:
a change of mind in the face of such opposition is not
enough to justify removing interests from the whanau
trust.96
This notion of dysfunction was finally put to bed
when the Court asserted that Moa would remain as a
trustee and a beneficiary on the trust, thus a partial
termination would not resolve any alleged dysfunction.
87. ibid [21].
88. ibid [22].
89. ibid [38].
90. ibid [39].
91. ibid.
92. ibid.
93. ibid [41].
94. ibid [42].
95. ibid [43].
96. ibid.
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What this case therefore coherently demonstrates is
the Court’s ability to recognize the underlying con-
cepts and meanings behind a whanau trust, and to
ensure that their reasoning reflects and underpins
those concepts and meanings to reflect a trust’s true
purpose. As Ambler J affirms, the partial termination
would be a retrograde step for this whanau, and
would contradict the original kaupapa that the sib-
lings embraced, that of unifying the whanau by bring-
ing the land interests together.97 Such unity:
does not grow on its own, it requires steady and con-
sistent fostering by members of the whanau,98
and that reflection of the purpose of this whanau trust
was explicitly recognized by the Court, and the Court
acted for the benefit of the whole, not the individual.
Overall, therefore, one can see how courts, in
regard to whanau trusts, are able to give full acknowl-
edgement to Maori beliefs and practices, and apply
the law practically to be able to resolve issues arising
from such trusts.
We now turn lastly to the matter of whenua topu
trusts, and some key points in relation to this type of
Maori land trust.
Whenua topu trusts
It will be recalled from earlier, that these trusts are
similar to the ahu whenua trusts in that they are land-
management trusts, but whenua topu trusts operate
to facilitate the use and administration of the land in
the interests of iwi99 or hapu,100 as opposed to those
with a beneficial interest in the land.101 Whanau,
putea, and kaitiaki trusts can operate under the um-
brella of these trusts. Almost anything that is legally in
order can be achieved under this trust. However, sale
of land can only occur through complying with very
strict rules that ensure the kaupapa of the Act is met,
in other words, the retention of Maori land under
Maori ownership. A number of trusts do not permit
sale of land entirely.102
The Maori Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
establish such trusts, and with respect to the trusts
that it establishes and monitors, a jurisdiction equiva-
lent to that of the High Court with respect to trusts
generally.103 Whenua topu trusts, as a form of trust,
have been available since the enactment of the Te
Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, and while in existence,
no person will become entitled to succeed to any
interest vested in the trustees for the purpose of the
trust.104
In the Maori Land Court case of Taueki v
McMillan,105 Harvey J referred to the benefits of utiliz-
ing such a trust in an administrative context for the
effective management of a trust. His Honour recom-
mended that the trustees and the beneficiaries consider
the device of whenua topu trusts, and noted that such a
trust may be established in the Court, is satisfied that it
would ‘promote and facilitate’ the ‘use and administra-
tion’ of the land in the ‘interests of the iwi or hapu’.106
Section 216(3) sets out the requirements of such
application for creating this type of trust:
An application for the constitution of a whenua topu
trust under this section—
a. shall be made in respect of all the beneficial
interests in 1 block or in 2 or more blocks of
land; and
b. may be made by or on behalf of any of the
owners or the Registrar of the court.
97. ibid [45].
98. ibid.
99. See (n 4).
100. See (n 5).
101. Boast and others (n 2); See (n 22) s 216(2).
102. See (n 8) 9–10.
103. Pirika v Eru (2013) MAC MB 127 28 March 2013 [28], referring respectively to the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act (n 22) ss 211 and 237.
104. Re Estate of Rachel Ngeungeu Zister 63 Waikato Maniopoto MB 286 27 September 2013 [95], also referring to (n 22) ss 216(2) and 216(6).
105. Taueki v McMillan BC201463687 2014.
106. ibid [120], citing (n 22) s 216(2).
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Section 216(4) states:
The court shall not grant an application made under
this section unless it is satisfied—
a. that the owners of the land to which the ap-
plication relates have had sufficient notice of
the application and sufficient opportunity to
discuss and consider it; and
b. that there is no meritorious objection to the
application among the owners, having regard
to the nature and importance of the matter.
In other words, the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction
requires that under section 216(4), sufficient notice
and opportunity must be given for discussion tests to
be satisfied, as well as there being no laudable objec-
tions to such a trust being created.107 Once such a
trust is created, the assets of the trust are held in ac-
cordance with Maori community purposes for the
general benefit of the iwi.108 His Honour also gave
examples of the following whenua topu trusts:109
a. the Pakaitore Whenua Topu Trust created by
the tribes of Whanganui to receive firstly
Pakaitore (Moutoa Gardens), the Whanganui
Courthouse lands and in due course, the
interests of the tribes of Whanganui in the
Kaitoke Prison and the Lismore State Forest;
b. Puke Ariki and Bayly Road whenua topu
trusts established for the benefit of the Ngati
Te Whiti hapu of Te Atiawa in Taranaki to
receive lands from private parties;
c. Rotoehu Forest whenua topu trust created to
receive former Crown forest licensed lands as
part of the Ngati Awa settlement for the bene-
fit of two particular hapu, Ngati Hikakino and
Ngai Te Rangihouhiri II.
Therefore, all the Court needs to be concerned
with, in considering whether to create such a trust,
is whether the tests for the creation of such a body
have been satisfied. He noted, importantly, that the
benefit of such a trust is that it does not require the
continuation of succession, and thus the subsequent
fragmentation of interests.110 This clearly is of advan-
tage for Maori interests within Maori land, thus it is
understandable why courts may promote their cre-
ation, where applicable to do so. However, as his
Honour noted, it is for the beneficiaries and trustees
to consider the merits of such a trust.111
As is evident with whenua topu trusts, the interests
of iwi must be represented, and the very recent case of
Te Runanga o Ngati Maru (Taranaki) Whenua Topu
Trust,112 discussed just this issue, which is our final
matter for discussion on Maori land trusts.
It was alleged that the trustees failed to represent
the interests of Ngati Maru on all matters by, inter
alia, failing to act as representatives for the iwi with
local council, the Department of Conservation, and
other third parties. One of the objects of the Trust was
to represent the interests of Ngati Maru on all matters
relating to the land and including use of the Trust’s
facilities.113
As Harvey J noted, if the trustees were not confer-
ring with their beneficiaries on a regular basis, then it
would be difficult to see how they were able to fulfil
this requirement satisfactorily. It is obvious that
where trustees are obliged to represent interests of a
tribe, ‘consultation with the constituents on a regular
and continuing basis is necessary’.114
His Honour did acknowledge that the trustees had
tried to meet their obligations oftentimes challenging
circumstances, however, trying to meet obligations is
not the same as actually meeting them. Where there
are difficulties in meeting such obligations, the onus
is on the trustees to seek direction from the court,
107. ibid [121].
108. ibid, referring to (n 22) ss 216(5) and 218.
109. ibid [122].
110. ibid [123].
111. ibid [123].
112. Re Runanga o Ngati Maru (Taranaki) Whenua Topu Trust 335 Aotea MB 1 27 March 2015.
113. ibid [76]–[78].
114. ibid [78].
Trusts & Trustees, Vol. 22, No. 2, March 2016 Articles 225
 by guest on February 24, 2016
http://tandt.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
which they had been advised to do in writing as well
as in open court.115 It was therefore, ‘inexplicable that
the trustees did not seek directions in such circum-
stances’.116 Generally speaking therefore, on this
point, the trustees had not been fulfilling their obli-
gations to their beneficiaries.
What this speaks to is the continued stringent duties
imposed on Maori trustees regardless of the type of
Maori land trust, and even if trustees face challenging
circumstances, this does not discharge their obligations.
To try is not a guarantee of success when it comes to
trustee obligations to iwi. It is evident that in the face of
challenges, a court expects to see positive action being
taken by trustees to resolve the issues, even if that means
turning to the court to seek direction.
Concluding remarks
It is evident, even from this brief foray in to Maori
land trusts, how valuable such trusts are in the unique
New Zealand legal landscape in recognizing and pro-
tecting Maori interests. To a large extent, the connec-
tion to Maori:
identity is manifested today through their ownership
in Maori land. Therefore, the legislation applying to
Maori land is important in respect of the connection
of people to their land.117
Nonetheless, trusts applying to Maori land are subject
to the general law of trusts, either through common
law requirements, or under the Trustees Act 1956, in
the same way as other types of trusts, which may be
stated as:118
[A]n equitable obligation binding a person (who is
called a trustee) to deal with property over which he
has control (which is called trust property) for the
benefit of persons (who are called beneficiaries) of
whom he may himself be one and any one of whom
may enforce the obligations.
However, as we have seen, Maori land trusts and
trustees are also subject to specific rules and obliga-
tions contained in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act
1993, as well as trust instruments, and the common
law applying specifically to such trusts. It is evident
from the cases that we have discussed that the courts
endeavour to recognize the rights of the beneficiaries
and the obligations of the trustees in a manner that
can best facilitate the retention and utilization of such
lands in a way that will align most appropriately with
Maori culture and beliefs. The case law to which we
have referred illustrates that the kaupapa of the Te
Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 is the promotion and
retention of Maori land within the hands of owners,
their whanau, and hapu, and in doing so, facilitates
the most beneficial occupation, development and uti-
lization of that land for the benefit of the owners,
their whanau, and hapu.119
Therefore, Maori land trusts are a fundamental part
of New Zealand legislation and New Zealand indigen-
ous culture, and of value, generally, as a relevant man-
agement tool for much Maori land.
Maori land trusts are a fundamental part of
New Zealand legislation and New Zealand in-
digenous culture, and of value, generally, as a
relevantmanagementtoolformuchMaoriland
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115. ibid [79].
116. ibid.
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119. See (n 8) 2.
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